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The Pennsylvania Trademark Act: Merely a
Shadow of the Federal Lanham Act?
INTRODUCTION

Trademark law is a component of the larger field of law dealing
with unfair competition.' The basic function of a trademark, and
the primary reason it is used by persons in commerce, is to act as a
symbol of the origin of the goods; that is, its purpose is primarily
to tell the purchaser who produced the product.2 Secondarily, by
attaching a symbol, mark or emblem to a product, a manufacturer
or producer distinguishes his or her product from other similar
products, and to some extent, attests to the product's genuineness
and quality.' The present day trademark, therefore, has several interrelated functions: (1) it serves to identify the origin of goods; (2)
it attests to the quality of the goods; and (3) it serves as a marketing tool.4 Moreover, it follows that exclusive use of a trademark
and the ability to preclude misuse of such marks by others, are
valuable rights that the law should endeavor to protect.
In Pennsylvania, as elsewhere in the United States, three distinct means of safeguarding trademark rights are available; they
are: (1) federal statutory protection; (2) state statutory protection;
and (3) common law protection.5 Both the federal statutory
scheme embodied in the Lanham Act,' and the Pennsylvania
scheme, as set forth in the Pennsylvania Trademark Act,' are centered upon formal systems which establish trademark rights based
on the time of registration of the mark in conformance with the
respective statutes' provisions.' Both statutes also require the filing
1. Hanover Star Milling Co. v Metcalf, 240 US 403, 413 (1916).
2. Campbell Soup Co. v Armour and Co., 81 F Supp 114, 120 (E D Pa 1948).
3. Manz v Philadelphia Brewing Co., 37 F Supp 79, 81 (E D Pa 1940).
4. Springfield Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v Founders Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 115 F Supp 787, 792 (N D Cal 1953).
5. The federal statute is known as the Lanham Act. Trademark Act of 1946, as
amended (The Lanham Act), 15 USC §§ 1051-1127 (1988). The Pennsylvania statute's short
name is the "Pennsylvania Trademark Act", 54 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 1101-26 (Purdon
1982).
6. 15 USC §§ 1051-1127.
7. 54 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 1101-26.
8. The procedure for registration under the federal statute is contained in section
1051 for the "Primary Register" and section 1091 for the "Supplemental Register." 15 USC
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of a formal application and the payment of a fee." Conversely, the
common law centers upon the acquisition of trademark rights
through commercial use and accordingly, does not require the filing of any specific paperwork or the payment of any fees. 10
Given the broad scope of the federal registration" system and
the common law protections which remain effective in spite of the
federal' or Pennsylvania statutes, 3 a question arises as to the
value of registration under the Pennsylvania statute. If the Pennsylvania Trademark Act offers no advantage to the client above
and beyond the federal statute, should not the prudent attorney
simply utilize the federal system when advising his client to register her mark? Further, in the case of a client who decides not to
file under the federal system, is there any point in suggesting that
she file under the Pennsylvania Trademark Act when the Pennsyl§§ 1051, 1091. The Supplemental Register in the federal system is available to register
marks that are capable of distinguishing products, but which are nonetheless not capable of
registration on the Principal Register because they fail to meet the requirements of section
1052(e-f). 15 USC § 1091(a). Registration on the Supplemental Register confers no substantive trademark rights beyond those at common law. Clairol v Gillette Co., 389 F2d 264, 267
(2d Cir 1968). Therefore, its existence is only mentioned in passing, and not discussed further in this comment.
The Commonwealth sets forth its registration requirements in section 1112 of the Pennsylvania Trademark Act. 54 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1112.
9. 15 USC § 1051; 54 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1112.
10. Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 US at 414-15.
11. The express purpose of the Lanham Act is to regulate the commercial use of
marks as broadly as Congressional power allows. The Act's purpose is set forth within the
text of the statute itself as follows:
The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce within the control of Congress by
making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such commerce; to
protect registered marks used in such commerce from interference by State, or territorial legislation; to protect persons engaged in such commerce against unfair competition; to prevent fraud and deception in such commerce by the use of reproductions,
copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered marks; and to provide rights
and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting trade-marks, trade
names, and unfair competition entered into between the United States and foreign
nations.
15 USC § 1128(2).
12. The Lanham Act states that registration upon the principal register will be denied if the mark in question:
Consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in the Patent
and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in the United States
by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with
the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive
15 USC § 1052(d).
13. The Pennsylvania Trademark Act specifically states that "[niothing in this chapter shall adversely affect the rights or the enforcement of rights in marks acquired in good
faith at anytime at common law." 54 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1126.
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vania statute does not override the applicable common law? In
other words, would such a filing under the Pennsylvania statute be
mere surplus and a waste of the client's resources?
This comment examines the relationship of the Pennsylvania
trademark statute to the other sources of trademark protection,
and concludes that the client concerned with protecting a trademark is marginally better served by registering his or her mark
under the Pennsylvania Trademark Act rather than relying solely
on common law rights, but is infinitely better served by ignoring
the Pennsylvania Act altogether in favor of the federal Lanham
Act.
COMMON LAW TRADEMARK PROTECTION

The common law recognizes trademarks as a subset of unfair
competition, the purpose of which is to prevent the palming off by
one person of his goods or business as that of another.1 4 A key
characteristic of trademarks at common law is that a trademark
must be used in connection with a business to be protectable.1 5 Because trademarks at common law can only be acquired through
commercial use, and not from mere adoption, it follows that common law trademarks can only be enforced within the geographic
area where business is actually conducted and the mark actually
used."' Additionally, enforcement of a common law trademark
right is only possible when the alleged infringer is using the mark
on a product similar enough to be competitive with that of the
17
original user.
14. Gamlen Chemical Co. v Gamlen, 79 F Supp 622, 632 (W D Pa 1948).
15. Coca-Cola Co. v Busch, 44 F Supp 405, 407 (E D Pa 1942).
16. Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 US at 415. The Hanover case involved a company,
Allan Wheeler Co., which sold flour in markets north of the Ohio River, under the name
"Tea Rose" and used a mark consisting of three roses. Id at 406. Allan Wheeler sought to
enjoin the use of the name and a similar mark by the Hanover Company who was using it in
several southern states, principally Alabama, on the theory that Allan Wheeler had adopted
the name and mark at an earlier date. Id. The Court acknowledged that while it is true that
in the case of two parties competing in the same market that prior appropriation determines
rights to the mark, that general rule does not apply if the markets are independent. Id at
416. The Court held that if two parties independently use the same mark on goods of the
same class in totally separate remote markets, then each party has the better right to the
mark in their chosen market, irrespective of whose use antedates the others. Id at 419. This
is the case so long as the second adopter has chosen the mark in good faith, with no design
inimical to the interests of the prior user. Id.
17. Id at 414. The Court agreed with the English common law notion that a trademark holder has no property right in the mark per se absent a relation to his particular
trade. Id. Therefore, a person who may have a right to a given mark in relation to his trade
in iron, would have no right to exclude the use of the same mark in good faith by a
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The mere use of a mark in commerce, however, is not necessarily
enough to make it a protectable trademark at common law. For
example, the use of ordinary descriptive words are not protected
unless a secondary meaning has attached."8 Secondary meaning is
said to have attached when the public has come to recognize a
given word or phrase as peculiarly applicable to a given product."0
Consequently, the general rule is that merely descriptive terms or
geographical terms cannot be appropriated by anyone for their exclusive use.20 The rationale behind this rule is that exclusive appropriation of certain terms would make it impossible for competitors to accurately describe their goods, thereby leading to a
monopoly for the appropriator.2 ' The exception to this general rule
is that exclusive use of such terms can be developed over time, if
and when the term acquires secondary meaning in the public
mind. 22 It should be noted, however, that the mere fact that a producer has extensively advertised a given product in connection
with a certain mark is not enough to prove secondary meaning has
attached.2 s It must be shown that the public actually perceives the
25
24
mark as identifying a specific product. Additionally, generic
words are not capable of protection unless secondary meaning attaches (in which case, of course, the word would no longer be
generic) .26
It is important to remember that common law protection is centered upon the prevention of unfair competition. Neither actual intent to deceive on the part of the infringer, nor actual confusion in
the public mind, are necessary elements to establish a case for promerchant dealing in linens. Id. This distinction reflects the Court's view that a trademark is
a protection for the goodwill of a business, and therefore, must be used in connection with
an ongoing business to be protectable. Id.
18. Brody et al v Cohen, 60 Pa D & C 27, 32 (Phila Co 1947). Brody involved a
company's attempt to claim the label "Boys Togs" as a protectable trademark. The court
found these to be merely descriptive words (no different then simply calling the product
boys pants) that were incapable of protection absent the attachment of secondary meaning.
Brody et al, 60 Pa D & C at 32.
19. Id.
20. Id at 33.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id at 36.
24. Id.
25. Generic marks are those which "include words which embrace [an] entire class of
products or services, not all of which necessarily emanate from the same source." Black's
Law Dictionary 686 (West, 6th ed 1990),.
26. Golden Slipper Square Club v Golden Slipper Restaurant and CateringInc., 371
Pa 92, 96, 88 A2d 734, 736 (1952).
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tection of a trademark.2 7 Such factors are, however, relevant to the
determination of whether relief is appropriate, especially in a situation where the alleged infringer is28not engaged in a business similar to the business of the plaintiff.
Accordingly, it is fair to summarize that, in general, unique
terms or symbols which are actually used in commerce are proper
subjects for protection under the common law. The right to exclusive use is established by being the first to employ a given mark in
commerce and the protection furnished by the common law is limited to the geographic region and industry in which the mark is
employed. Other non-unique terms are also protectable, but only if
secondary meaning has attached in the public's mind. Protection
can conceivably be extended beyond the industry in which the
mark is employed upon a showing of a bad intent by the 'later user,
especially upon a showing of actual confusion in the market place.
FEDERAL STATUTORY TRADEMARK PROTECTION

The federal trademark statute, known as the Lanham Act, was
enacted in 1946 and significantly amended in 1988.29 The Lanham
Act, in large part, does not create new federal trademark rights,
but rather primarily establishes a system of registering trademarks."0 The act provides for an initial registration period of ten
years,3 1 and for subsequent renewal of the registration in ten year
increments for an unlimited period of time as long as the mark
continues to be used in commerce.32
The act of registering a mark on the Primary Register33 under
the Lanham Act does not in itself create any trademark right in
the registrant.3 4 What establishes the right is the use of the mark
27. Golden Slipper, 88 A2d at 736.
28. Id at 736. In Golden Slipper, the plaintiff was a charitable organization pressing
for injunctive relief against a restaurant that had assumed a similar name. Id at 735. The
court ruled that despite the fact that the charity and restaurant engaged in substantially

different businesses, it was appropriate to enjoin the restaurant from using the Golden Slipper name. Id at 736. The court's finding was that the restaurant owner had adopted the
name to trade on the established goodwill of the charity and was in fact causing confusion in
the public mind. Id.
29. 15 USC § 1051. See notes on repeal and savings provisions which follow the statute section.
30.

15 USC § 1051. This section of the Act provides for the registration of marks on

the Primary Register. Id. See note 8.
31.
32.
33.

15 USC § 1058(a).
15 USC § 1059(a).
See note 8 for an explanation of the Primary Register.

34. Proxite Products Inc. v Bonnie Brite Products Corp., 206 F Supp 511, 514 (S D
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in commerce as a designator of the source of the product s5 Registration under the Act does, however, afford the registrant certain
advantages not available at common law. The most significant of
these advantages are: (1) the ability to establish a priority date
prior to actually using the mark in commerce; (2) the ability to
establish rights in a mark beyond the geographic area in which it is
actually used in commerce (because registration serves as constructive notice); (3) the elimination of the defense of innocent infringement (again because of the constructive notice aspect of registration); (4) access to the federal courts; and (5) the ability to make
the existence of secondary meaning incontestable.
Up until the 1988 amendment to the Lanham Act, an owner applying for registration had to attest that the mark had, in fact, already been used in commerce." The 1988 amendment, however,
NY 1962).
35. Proxite Products,206 F Supp at 514. "The exclusive right to the use of a trademark has always rested and still rests on the common law." Id at 514 citing the Trademark
Cases, 100 US 82 (1879). What the Lanham Act does is provide for the issuance of a Certificate of Registration for a mark that is registered on the Principle Register of the Patent and
Trademark office. This certificate is taken as prima facie evidence of "the validity of the
registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the registrant's ownership of the
mark, and the registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce on or in
connection with the goods and services specified in the certificate subject to any condition or
limitations stated in the certificate." 15 USC § 1057(b).
36. 15 USC § 1051(a) (which was the only provision for registration on the Principal
Register under the original 1946 version of the statute), states:
(a) Trade-Marks Used in Commerce
The owner of a trademark used in commerce may apply to register his or her trademark under this chapter on the principal register established:
(1) By filing in the Patent and Trademark Office(A) a written application, in such form as may be prescribed by the
Commissioner, verified by the applicant, or by a member of the firm or
an officer of the corporation or association applying, specifying applicant's domicile and citizenship, the date of applicant's first use of the
mark in commerce, the goods in connection with which the mark is used
and the mode or manner in which the mark is used in connection with
such goods, and including a statement to the effect that the person making the verification believes himself, or the firm, corporation, or association in whose behalf he makes the verification, to be the owner of the
mark sought to be registered, that the mark is in use in commerce, and
that no other person, firm, corporation, or association, to the best of his
knowledge and belief, has the right to use such mark in commerce either
in the identical form thereof or in such near resemblance thereto as to
be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of such other
person, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive: Provided,
That in the case of every application claiming concurrent use the applicant shall state exceptions to his claim of exclusive use, in which he
shall specify, to the extent of his knowledge, any concurrent use by
others, the goods on or in connection with which and the areas in which
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added section 1051(b) which allowed for the registration of marks
that are merely intended to be used in commerce.37 The general
procedure to be followed is that after applying for registration of a
mark that has not yet been used in commerce under section
1051(b), the applicant must then actually use the mark in commerce and file a statement verifying such use with the Patent and
Trademark Office within six months of the initial registration. 8
Once this verification statement has been submitted, the registration is perfected and the mark is registered with a priority date
each concurrent use exists, the periods of each use, and the goods and
area for which the applicant desires registration;
(B) a drawing of the mark; and
(C) such number of specimens or facsimiles of the mark as used as may
be required by the Commissioner.
(2) By paying into the Patent and Trademark Office the prescribed fee.
(3) By complying with such rules or regulations, not inconsistent with law, as
may be prescribed by the Commissioner.
15 USC § 1051(a).

37. 15 USC § 1051(b) states:
(b) Trade-Marks Intended for Use in Commerce
A person who has a bona fide intention, under circumstances showing the good faith
of such person, to use a trademark in commerce may apply to register the trademark
under this chapter on the principal register hereby established:
(1) By filing in the Patent and Trademark Office(A) a written application, in such form as may be prescribed by the
Commissioner, verified by the applicant, or by a member of the firm or
an officer of the corporation or association applying, specifying applicant's domicile and citizenship, applicant's bona fide intention to use
the mark in commerce, the goods on or in connection with which the
applicant has a bona fide intention to use the mark and the mode or
manner in which the mark is intended to be used on or in connection
with such goods, including a statement to the effect that the person
making the verification believes himself or herself, or the firm, corporation, or association in whose behalf he or she makes the verification, to
be entitled to use the mark in commerce, and that no other person, firm,
corporation, or association, to the best of his or her knowledge and belief, has the right to use such mark in commerce either in the identical
form of the mark or in such resemblance to the mark as to be likely,
when used in connection with the goods of such other person, to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; however, except for applications filed pursuant to section 1126 of this title, no mark shall be registered until the applicant has met the requirements of subsection (d) of
this section; and
(B) a drawing of the mark.
(2) By paying in the Patent and Trademark Office the prescribed fee.
(3) By complying with such rules or regulations, not inconsistent with law, as
may be prescribed by the Commissioner.
15 USC § 1051(b).
38. 15 USC § 1051(d)(1).
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established as of the initial application. 9 Furthermore, upon a
showing of good cause, and on payment of the prescribed fees, an
applicant can delay the requirement of actual use in commerce for
a period of up to three years (and still retain the right to a priority
date as of the initial filing). 0 This ability to register a mark and
establish priority from the date of the original filing is a major
deviation from the common law which requires actual use.
The provision of the Lanham Act that registration serves as constructive use of a mark is also a deviation from the common law in
that it does not require actual use within a particular geographic
area to establish a right to exclusive use of the mark within that
area.4 1 Mere registration establishes the registrant's rights
nationwide.4 2
The Lanham Act also grants the federal courts original subject
matter jurisdiction to hear trademark cases if the mark has been
registered under the Act.4 3 This access to the federal courts is independent of the existence of diversity of citizenship of the parties
or the amount in controversy.4 4 Of course, the statutory grant of
access to the federal courts does not preclude the option of commencing an action to enjoin and/or recover damages for infringement of a registered trademark in the state courts.
39. 15 USC § 1057(c).
40. 15 USC § 1051(d)(2).
41. The Act specifies that registration on the Principal Register is to be considered as
constructive use of the mark in commerce. The applicable section states:
Contingent on the registration of a mark on the principal register provided by this
chapter, the filing of the application to register such mark shall constitute constructive use of the mark, conferring a right of priority, nationwide in effect, on or in
connection with the goods or services specified in the registration against any other
person except for a person whose mark has not been abandoned and who, prior to
such filing(1) has used the mark;
(2) has filed an application to register the mark which is pending or has resulted in
the registration of the mark; or
(3) has filed a foreign application to register the mark on the basis of which he or she
has acquired a right of priority, and timely files an application under section 1126(d)
of this title to register the mark which is pending or has resulted in the registration of
the mark.
15 USC § 1057(c).
42. Id.
43. 15 USC § 1121(a), which states that "[t]he district and territorial courts of the
United States shall have original jurisdiction and the courts of appeal of the United States
(other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have appellate
jurisdiction, of all actions arising under this chapter, without regard to the amount in controversy or to the diversity or lack of diversity of the citizenship of the parties." Id.
44. Id.
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Finally, section 1065 of the Lanham Act (which requires the registrant to file an affidavit between the fifth and sixth years following registration stating that the registered mark has been in continuous use for the first five years of registration and is still in use
in commerce) has the effect of making the validity of the mark
virtually incontestable. 5 This is significant for trademarks which
depend on secondary meaning for their registrability under the
Act."' Section 1065 makes it impossible for a mark to be challenged
on the ground that no secondary meaning has attached once the
required affidavit has been filed. The common law has no such provision for making secondary meaning incontestable regardless of
how long the mark has been used.
It is beyond the scope of this comment to delve into the various
nuances of the federal Lanham Act. For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that the Act is basically a registration system that
supplements the common law of trademarks, with the few major
exceptions stated above. For, beyond these major deviations, the
common law is basically intact. That is to say, the usual common
law restrictions, for example, those on appropriation of generic or
descriptive terms, remain unchanged by the Lanham Act. Accordingly, a person with a preexisting common law right tothe use of a
mark within a given geographic area still has the better right to the
use of his or her mark in that area than a good faith registrant
under the Act who registered a similar mark later in time. Significantly, this is true despite the fact that the initial user never registered the mark."
45.

15 USC § 1065.

46. To be registered on the Principal Register a mark must distinguish the goods of
the mark user from the goods of others. 15 USC § 1052. A mark that is merely descriptive,
therefore, cannot be registered unless secondary meaning has attached. That is, unless the
public has come to recognize a given mark as peculiarly applicable to a given product. Brody
et al v Cohen, 60 Pa D & C 27, 32 (Phila Co 1947).
47. Beyond addressing trademarks, a major feature of the Act, not discussed in this
comment, is the statute's recognition of a federal civil cause of action for unfair competition.
15 USC § 1125. This section's availability is not limited to marks registered under the Act.

Id.
48. Atlantic Monthly Co. v Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 197 F Supp 524, 528 (S
D NY 1961). In this infringement action, the defendant tried to attach some significance to
the fact that the plaintiff had never registered the mark in question. The court rejected the
defendant's approach, stating "registration neither creates a trade-mark nor is essential to
its validity. . . . [T]he fact that the mark is not registered does not diminish plaintiff's
common-law right to protection." Atlantic Monthly, 197 F Supp at 528.
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STATUTORY PROTECTION

The Pennsylvania Trademark Act was enacted in 1982.4a The
Act provides for the registration of trademarks, including service
marks and trade names that have been adopted and used within
the Commonwealth.5 The statute allows for the registration of
trademarks for one or more enumerated classes of goods or services, 51 not specifically excluded from registration, for an initial
term of ten years.5 2 The registrant may then renew the registration
for an unrestricted number of additional ten year periods as long
as the mark continues to be used in the Commonwealth.5" As previously noted, marks registered under the state Act must have
been actually used prior to registration; there is no provision for
the registration of marks that are merely intended to be used. The
statute goes on to define what constitutes infringement of a registrant's rights 54 and sets forth the remedies available.5 5 Significantly, the statute's final section states that "[n]othing in this
chapter shall adversely affect the rights or the enforcement of
rights in marks acquired in good faith at anytime at common
law."56
Under the Pennsylvania Trademark Act, therefore, there exists
both similarities and differences as compared to the federal Lanham Act. Like the federal law, the Pennsylvania Act is primarily a
system for registering trademarks. Also similar to the Lanham Act,
registration under the Pennsylvania statute constitutes constructive notice of the use of the mark over a broader area than its actual use; the reach of the Pennsylvania Act is, however, limited to
49. Pennsylvania Trademark Act, 54 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ i101-26(Purdon 1982).
50. 54 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1102. A "service mark" is used "to identify the services of
one person and distinguish them from the services of another." Black's Law Dictionary 1369
(West 6th ed 1990). A "trade name" is "that name used by manufacturers, industrialists and
merchants to identify their businesses ...." Black's Law Dictionary 1494. For the purposes
of this statute, the term "adopted and used" is defined as:
A trademark shall be deemed 'adopted and used' in this Commonwealth when it is
placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays associated
therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, and such goods are sold or otherwise
distributed in this Commonwealth. A service mark shall be deemed to be 'adopted
and used' in this Commonwealth when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the services are rendered in this Commonwealth.
54 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1102.
51. 54 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1103.
52. 54 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1114.
53. Id.
54. 54 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1123.
55. 54 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1125.
56. 54 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1126.
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the boundaries of the Commonwealth, versus the federal statute's
constructive notice provisions which apply nationwide."7 Finally,
the Pennsylvania Trademark Act, like the Lanham Act, clearly
does not give a registrant better rights than a prior user with common law rights within the geographic confines of the prior user's
actual commercial area.
Unlike the Lanham Act, the Pennsylvania statute mirrors the
common law in that the statute does not provide for protection of
marks merely intended to be used in commerce (actual use is required) and there is no mechanism within the Act which can
render the secondary meaning of a descriptive mark incontestable.
Another difference between the state and federal statutes is that
the state statute naturally cannot give its registrants access to the
federal courts absent the usual diversity of citizenship and amount
in controversy requirements.
DOES THE PENNSYLVANIA TRADEMARK AcT SERVE ANY USEFUL

PURPOSE?
As the foregoing discussion stated, the Pennsylvania Trademark
Act is, with few exceptions, a near perfect mirror of the Pennsylvania common law as it relates to trademarks. One exception of some
significance, however, is section 1123 of the Act. This section works
to give a registrant under the Act a statewide right to exclude all
later users and registrants despite the fact that his or her business
may not have actually used the mark statewide (the common law
would restrict the right to exclude later users to only those geographic areas within the state where the mark was actually used).
It is interesting to note from a historical perspective that Pennsylvania's legislature has had statutes dating back to 1895 that
have allowed the registration of trademarks in varying degrees. 8
The 1895 statute and subsequent trademark legislation up to and
including the present Pennsylvania Trademark Act, all had the effect of giving the registrant exclusive rights to a registered mark
throughout the Commonwealth. The 1895 act was limited to the
registration of marks by associations and unions of workmen.59 A
57. 54 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1123. Section 1123 defines what acts constitute infringement of a registrant's rights. This section does not use the terminology constructive use, but
clearly gives the registrant the right to enforce his right to exclusive use of his mark over
any infringer within the Commonwealth without regard to whether or not the registrant had
actually used the mark in commerce in all corners of the state. Id.

58.
59.

Act of May 21, 1895, Pub L No 68.
Id.
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broader act was passed in 1901 that allowed the registration of
trademarks by copartnerships, corporations, and any person or
persons.6 0 The 1901 legislation then was replaced in 1951 by legislation that was fairly similar to the present Pennsylvania Trademark Act." There is little legislative history relating to the present
Pennsylvania Trademark Act of 1982 or its most recent forerunner,
the 1951 act. Both of these pieces of legislation were passed after
the enactment of the federal Lanham Act in 1946, yet neither address the fact that a federal registration system for trademarks was
in existence. Thus, it appears that the Pennsylvania Trademark
Act was simply the latest in a line of revisions to a registration
system that predated the Lanham Act without regard to whether a
state system was still of any practical use. While the small advantage of section 1123 of the present Pennsylvania Trademark Act
may justify the existence of the statute to some extent, the availability of the infinitely more advantageous Lanham Act registration
dwarfs the Pennsylvania statute's potential advantages.
One of the advantages of the Lanham Act is that it gives the
federal registrant the advantage of nationwide constructive use
upon registration of his or her mark on the Principal Register.
This is critical because, as a practical matter, if there is any likelihood that a business may expand to encompass Pennsylvania, it is
just as likely that that business will cross state lines. A Pittsburgh
business, for instance, would be much more likely to venture into
Ohio, a few miles west, rather than expand into the considerably
more distant eastern reaches of Pennsylvania. The Lanham Act
also has the added advantage of allowing a business to tie up a
mark for up to three years while, for instance, a product is being
developed. The Pennsylvania statute offers no such flexibility.
Lastly, the Lanham Act allows the registrant of a descriptive mark
(that is a mark that is not inherently distinctive) to make the issue
of secondary meaning incontestable. Again, the Pennsylvania Act
offers no such advantage. Accordingly, these three substantial advantages of the Lanham Act over the Pennsylvania Trademark Act
far outweigh the difference in filing costs between the two registration schemes, which now stands at a meager $158.00.62
60. Act of June 20, 1901, Pub L No 286.
61. Act of September 26, 1951, Pub L No 381.
62. The 1992 fee charged for trademark registration by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is $52.00. Pa Dept of State Application Form. The federal trademark registration
fee in effect as of October 1, 1992 is $210.00. Basic Facts About Trademarks, US Dept of
Commerce, Patent and Trademark Office (Revised Feb 1992).
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One potential drawback of the Lanham Act which tends to lend
some credibility to the existence of the separate state statute is the
possibility that the Lanham Act may not be applied to regulate a
mark used strictly intrastate when the business in question has no
ties to interstate commerce. This potential hole in Lanham's scope
arises because Congress' power to regulate trademarks is derived
from a different source than its authority to regulate other types of
intellectual property. 3 Specifically, the United States Constitution
expressly gave Congress the power to regulate patents and copyrights.6 There is no such grant of power concerning trademarks,
hence, Congress has had to rely on the Commerce Clause as a
source of power over this specie of intellectual property.65
Congress' early attempts to regulate trademarks based on the
grant of power in the Commerce Clause (which gives Congress the
power to regulate interstate commerce) were struck down by the
United States Supreme Court as being unconstitutional. 6 The
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the breadth of
the Commerce Clause as a source of Congressional power (that is,
what activities have an effect on commerce between the states and
therefore can be regulated by Congress) has been greatly expanded
over the years. For the application of the Lanham Act to a given
mark to be unquestionably constitutional, it is still prudent to use
the mark in at least one interstate commercial transaction. 7 While
63. Miles LaboratoriesInc. v Frolich, 195 F Supp 256, 257 (S D Cal 1961).
64. US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 8. This section specifically gives the Congress the power
"[tJo promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries

." Id.
65. US Const Art I, § 8, cl3. This section gives Congress the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with Indian Tribes

Id.

.

66. US v Steffens, 100 US 82, 99 (1879). The Court in Steffens in considering
whether Congress had the power to regulate trademarks decided that Congress could not
regulate trademarks per se, without an interstate connection bringing the matter within its

power under the Commerce Clause. The Court concluded, therefore, that strictly intrastate
use of a mark was outside of Congress' power to regulate. Steffens, 100 US at 97.
67. Miles Laboratories Inc., 195 F Supp at 257. In Miles, the court addressed the
question of whether Congress had the power to regulate trademarks (through the Lanham
Act) when the case involved a plaintiff engaged in interstate commerce, and a defendant
company doing virtually all of its business within the state of California. The court noted
that Lanham's reach could extend only as far as Congress' power to regulate commerce, and
that that power applied to interstate commerce. The court found in Miles that since the
defendant had stipulated that he had engaged in some small amount of interstate commerce, Lanham applied. The court's conclusion was based on the premise that "[a] single
actual sale or use by defendant in another state would be sufficient interstate commerce to
give federal protection under the Act .... " Miles, 195 F Supp at 257-58.
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'it is settled that the use of a trademark in a single interstate sale
will justify the registration of that mark under the Lanham Act, 8
there have been federal court decisions that have held the Act constitutional as applied to situations where the existence of interstate
commerce was not as clear cut as a single sale. For instance, in
Dawn Donut Co. v Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 9 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the fact that an
alleged infringer was engaged in only intrastate commerce, did not
preclude the application of the Lanham Act when the plaintiff
(who had registered under the Lanham Act) was engaged in interstate commerce.7 0 Likewise, the federal courts have held marks
used by an intrastate gas station chain servicing interstate travellers, 71 and a retailer selling merchandise wholly within one state
but purchased from overseas as being registerable under the Lanham Act.7 2 However, the willingness of the federal courts to find an
68. Id.
69. 267 F2d 358 (2d Cir 1959).
70. Dawn Donut, 267 F2d at 365. The court noted that Congress clearly,
has the power under the commerce clause to afford protection to marks used in interstate commerce. That being so, the only relevant question is whether the intrastate
activity forbidden by the Act is 'sufficiently substantial and adverse to Congress' paramount policy declared in the Act.'. . . If a -registrant's right to employ its trademark
were subject within every state's borders to preemption or concurrent use by local
business, the protection afforded a registrant by the Lanham Act would be rendered
virtually meaningless. Therefore we think it is within Congress' 'necessary any
proper' power to preclude a local intrastate user from acquiring any right to use the
same mark.
Id (citations omitted).
71. In re Gastown, Inc., 326 F2d 780 (US Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
1964)(This court was replaced in 1982 by the federal circuit courts). In Gastown, the court
reasoned that because the gas station chain, located within Ohio, had some of its stations
located on interstate highways and because some of those stations serviced customers from
other states, its service mark was registerable under the Lanham Act. Gastown, 326 F2d at
782. The court noted that the fact that the mark, used to identify the gas stations, never
crossed state lines was of no consequence because the patrons and the delivered gasoline did
travel interstate. Id at 783. Accordingly, the court reversed the decision of the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board, and allowed registration of the mark under the Lanham Act. The
court distinguished a very similar case, In re Bookbinder's Restaurant, Inc., 240 F2d 365
(US Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 1957) (see note 73 and accompanying text), on
the grounds that in that situation the applicant simply failed to verify its statements that
its patrons crossed state lines to utilize its services. Gastown, 326 F2d at 783-84.
72. In re Silenus Wines, Inc., 557 F2d 806 (US Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
1977). In Silenus, the court followed Gastown, 326 F2d at 782, finding that a retailer that
imports wine from France, then sells it solely within the state, can still register a trademark
under Lanham under the Commerce Clause. Silenus Wines, 557 F2d at 807. The court
noted that in Gastown it had "determined that the definition [of commerce] includes intrastate commerce when such commerce directly affects other commerce which Congress may
lawfully regulate." Id at 808. With similar reasoning the same court in Silenus, held "that

1993

Comments

555

interstate connection that will make the Lanham Act constitutionally applicable is not without bounds. For instance, in the case of
Bookbinder's Restaurant, Inc., a the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held that a restaurant located in one
state could not register a mark under the Lanham Act absent proof
that at least some of its clientele were travelling from other states
to dine at the establishment and possibly that some of the
restau74
rant's products were being transported across state lines.
CONCLUSION

It is prudent, though certainly not necessary, for a person utilizing a trademark to register it under either the federal or state registration statutes. .While paying to register a mark, especially
under the Pennsylvania statute, in many cases, would not enhance
the mark user's protection beyond that which is provided by the
common law at no cost, the act of registering does have a practical
benefit. In the event of a future controversy involving the issue of
which of two parties began to use a given mark first, a party who
has registered his or her mark has, at the very least, definitive
proof that he was using the mark as of the date of registration.
This potential benefit of registration is minor at best. Yet, the cost
of registration under either system is very low and coupled with
the additional benefits the chosen system may afford, it seems obvious that registration under either system could be money well
spent. Having decided registration of some sort is desirable, it is
apparent from the comparison of the two statutes that the federal
registration scheme under the Lanham Act is significantly superior
to the Pennsylvania Trademark Act in virtually all respects. The
superiority of the Lanham Act is accentuated by the fact that the
cost between the federal and state registrations is insignificant. On
intrastate sale of goods, by a party who caused those goods to move in regulatable commerce, directly affects that commerce and is itself regulatable." Id at 809.
73. In re Bookbinder'sRestaurant,Inc., 240 F2d 365 (US Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 1957).
74. Bookbinder's, 240 F2d at 368. The Bookbinder's court upheld the decision below
to forbid registration of the restaurant's mark under the Lanham Act because the Commerce Clause would only allow Congress to regulate intrastate commerce if it had a direct
effect on interstate commerce. Id at 367. The court did clearly point out that the restaurant's attorney's claim that the restaurant had an interstate connection through its out of
state clients was wholly unverified (although the restaurant was located in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, very close to the border of neighboring New Jersey). Id at 368. So it appears
from the court's comments that had a proper showing of proof of the alleged connections
with out of state patrons been made, it would have likely resulted in a different outcome.
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the downside, however, the Lanham Act theoretically may not be
constitutionally applicable in the rare instance where a business
operates totally within the Commonwealth and has no ties whatsoever with interstate commerce. Although the courts have historically stretched to find interstate connections to give Congress
power via the Commerce Clause in the past, this Achilles' heel does
exist. For the attorney advising his or her client on the advantages
of registration, there seems no doubt that a circumspect counselor
would recommend the federal system. Yet, prudence may dictate
that the client be advised to engage in and document at least a
single interstate sale or service to an interstate customer in order
to avoid Lanham's minor constitutional pitfall.
David Gilmartin

